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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF. UTAH 
SALT BOWL COMPANY A 
UTAH CORPORATION 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
—vs— 
STATE OF UTAH 
Defendant and Appellant 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a Civil action to recover damages for 
alleged wrongful termination of a lease agreement 
between the parties above named. Appellant served a 
notice of violation on the Respondent to which the 
Respondent responded by cancelling auto races 
scheduled at the Utah State Fairgrounds. The notice of 
violation was served by Appellant in response to a 
"noise ordinance" passed by Salt Lake City and a 
failure on the part of Respondent to obtain a variance 
from Salt Lake City to conduct its races. 
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The case was tried in two parts without a jury. The 
first part on the question of liability and the second part 
on the question of damages. 
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT 
The trial court found that Respondent was entitled 
to damages caused by the wrongful termination by 
Appellant of a Lease agreement between the parties. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the courts judgment 
or remand of the case with an instruction that the 
notice of violation was legally justifiable and that 
respondent is not entitled to damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Division of Expositions of the State of 
Utah, and Respondent, Salt Bowl Company, entered 
into a five year lease agreement on October 11, 1967. 
(Ex P-l, R-32, Tr 20). The lease was for a period from 
May 1, 1967 to May 1, 1973 and granted Respondent 
the right to use certain portions of the Utah State 
Fairgrounds to conduct auto racing. The lease 
agreement contained an exclusive option to renew the 
lease agreement for an additional term of five years. (R-
32, Ex P-l paragraph 18). 
Two methods are provided in the lease agreement 
for termination. Paragraph 13 provides for automatic 
termination if a Court having jurisdiction determines 
that Lessee's activities are unlawful Paragraphs 9 and 
16 provide a second method of termination. Paragraph 
9 requires the lessee to "conduct activities on the above 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
described premises in a lawful manner shall 
comply with all. . . .Local laws in connection with its 
operations " Paragraph 16 provides that if 
Lessor has reason to believe Lessee is in violation of 
any "Local Law" the Lessor shall send Lessee a notice 
of violation and Lessee is required to correct the 
violation within 5 days or the lease will be terminated. 
The subject case involves the above described 
lease and a request for renewal of the lease by 
Respondent filed May 1, 1973 (Ex P-3) and a notice of 
violation served on Respondent May 12, 1973 pursuant 
to paragraph 9 of the lease. (Ex P-4) The notice of 
violation was served for violation of the Salt Lake City 
"Noise Ordinance" (32-9-3 subparagraph P, Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City) specifically for races run 
on the 6th day of September, 1972 but generally for 
running any races in violation of the ordinance. The 
notice provided for the 5 day cure period but stated 
that the "termination was to be effective in the 6th day 
after service of this notice since there is no way in 
which the said violation can be corrected within said 
period of time." (Ex P-4) 
The notice of violation was based on the belief by 
the Attorney General's office who were reviewing the 
subject lease for renewal that Respondent had run 
races exceeding the noise limits imposed by the or-
dinance and at the time of the notice of violation 
further believed that Respondent could not run races in 
compliance with the Ordinance. (Tr. 146Ln.27-147Ln.2 
and Tr.60Ln. 12-18 Testimony of Frank Nelson, 
Assistant Attorney General and Robert B. Hansen 
Deputy Attorney General) 
The history behind the actual serving of the notice 
of violation by Appellant reveals that on August 16, 
1972, Salt Lake City passed an ordinance which would 
3 
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require Respondent to comply with a decibel rating of 
65 decibels in conducting its races (Tr.163 M 21). It was 
stipulated in open Court (Tr. 176 Ms 5-8) that the map 
introduced as Exhibit D-5 showed zones which required 
a 65 decibel compliance. 
In July of 1972, the Respondent made noise level 
tests using an H. H. Scott Company sound level meter 
(Trl57Ln. 24-30 Tr.80) approximately one block north 
of the fairgrounds at 1000 West and 300 North during 
actual warmups and races. (Tr.158Ln.8-10) The results 
ranged from the low to mid 70's which readings were 
higher than the ordinance allowed. 
Based on the July tests Respondent went before 
the Salt Lake City Commission and asked for vari-
ances for August 19, 26 and September 4. (Ex8-D) The 
Board of City Commissioners granted variances 
specifically for the days of August 19, 26, and Sep-
tember 4. (Ex. 9-D). The races scheduled for the 4th 
were rained out and rerun on the 6th. Respondent 
made no attempt to obtain a variance for the 6th. 
Respondent in the Spring of 1973, appeared before 
the Salt Lake City Commission to request a variance to 
78 devibels based on its earlier July tests (Tr. In. 10-
30) The hearing was held May 10, 1973 and Respondent 
represented to the Commission that "If the variance 
was not granted that we would have to change our 
method of racing, or racing as we had done in the past, 
we would not be able to do in the future. (Tr.166 Ln. 28-
30). 
The Commission denied Respondent's request for 
a variance based on tests made by Irvine Accoustical 
Engineers which showed the noise level of the race 
would be 13 points higher than allowable (Tr.170 Exll-
D) - - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ...' / : : - . ^ v - - : . ^ , . : - v : : ^ - . 
There were newspaper reports that Respondent 
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intended to race on the 12th of May at its regularly 
scheduled race. The Appellant made the decision to 
serve the notice of violation on Respondent prior to the 
race on the 12th of May (Tr.151 Ln.27-30). Respondent 
cancelled the race of the 12th voluntarily and has not 
raced since that time at the Fairgrounds. (Tr. 230Ln. 24-
30) (Findings of Fact (3) R-9). A noise test was run that 
same day on the 12th of May with one car and again the 
noise from one car exceeded the decibel level required 
by the ordinance. Ferrol Papworth told Mr. Hugh 
Bringhurst, Director of Expositions that he could not 
run within the decibel levels required by the Ordinance 
(Tr. 133 Ln. 2-18). 
Thereafter a letter was written on June 11, 1973 
inviting the Respondent to return to the Fairgrounds to 
race (R-9 Finding No. 4) which invitation Respondent 
did not accept. No legal action was taken by 
Respondent such as injunction until this present action 
was filed. (Tr.231Ln.4 and 19) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AFTER FINDING THAT THE RACE CON-
DUCTED ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1972 WAS IN-
VIOLATION OF 32-9-3 REVISED OR-
DINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY, THE COURT 
ERRED IN NOT CONCLUDING THAT VIOLATION 
WAS A LEGALLY JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS FOR 
SERVING "notice of violation" ON RESPONDENT, 
SALT BOWL COMPANY. 
In discussion with counsel on Friday, January 11, 
1974 (Tr.192 Ln.20-28) the court found that the race 
conducted on September 6,1972 was in violation of the 
"Noise Control" Ordinance. The court stated: 
5 
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"This pretrial order kind of bothered me in this thing 
because with reference to that race in September, 
whenever it was, I would have to find that that was a 
violation of the ordinance " 
The court went on to state: 
" but at the same time I can't see that it makes any 
difference. They should have had a waiver, and really its 
just a days continuance, so I don't take that into con-
sideration at all. . ." 
The notice of violation served by the Appellant 
dated May 11, 1973 was based on the September 6, 1972 
race conducted in violation of the Noise Ordinance. 
The court found that it was a violation as had the 
Attorney General's office. According to Paragraph 9 of 
the lease agreement such a violation is grounds for 
issuing a notice of violation as per paragraph 16 of the 
agreement, which Appellant did. 
The court indicated that the violation was not 
important because it was a technicality based on the 
fact that the September 4, 1972 race which was 
protected by the variance had been postponed until 
September 6, 1972. This view taken by the court 
overlooks the reason why all parties were concerned 
about the September 6th race, i.e., because it was a 
race which violated the ordinance due to the noise it 
created and not because it was not covered by a 
variance. 
As the Attorney General's office knew that 
Respondent had violated the "Noise Ordinance" by 
exceeding the decibel level in an R4 Zone on Sep-
tember 6, 1972, when it learned that no variance had 
been granted by the Salt Lake City Board of Com-
missioners for the 1973 season (Tr.143Ln.3-14) it used 
the violation of September 6, 1972 as a basis for the 
6 
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"notice of violation" dated May 11, 1972. (Tr.145Ln.27-
29) It was a violation in the eyes of the Attorney 
General's Office because the race was run at sound 
levels in excess of the ordinance and not merely 
because no variance was granted for the race. (Tr.153 
Ln.25-28) It was reasonable to believe that without the 
benefit of a variance, Respondent could not race 
legally. The lease agreement states that Respondent 
"Shall comply with all local laws" which the noise tests 
showed they could not do. "Shall comply" implies that 
without the variance it was clear the respondent 
violated or would violate the ordinance. 
Mr. Robert Hansen, Deputy Attorney General and 
Mr. Frank Nelson, Assistant Attorney General both 
testified that the "notice of violation" was served 
because the Respondent had conducted races in excess 
of the noise limits imposed by the ordinance and Salt 
Lake City would not grant them a variance, (Tr.146 
Ln.27-147 Ln.2) Mr. Ferrol Papworth, President of 
Respondent company, told Mr. Hugh Bringhurst, 
director of the Division of Expositions, on May 12, 1973 
that he could not run a race within the ordinance 
(Tr.133Ln.2-18). It was no surprise to anyone that a 
"notice of violation" was served. The evidence based 
on the Respondent's own study is nearly conclusive that 
Respondent could not run without violating a 
municipal ordinance and hence violate paragraph 9 of 
the lease agreement. The "notice of violation" pursuant 
to the lease agreement gave Respondent 5 days to show 
whether or not they could comply with the ordinance. 
Rather than conduct the race scheduled on May 12, 
1972, Respondent tested the noise levels of one car on 
that date and found the noise from a single car in excess 
of the required level. (Tr.133Ln.9-26). Knowing that it 
could not race, within the ordinance Respondent 
1 
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voluntarily cancelled the race scheduled that day 
(Courts Findings of Fact (3) R 9). Respondent has not to 
this day tried to run at the Fairgrounds. 
It is submitted that all parties understood that the 
"notice of violation" was for races run in excess of the 
level proscribed by the ordinance and that Respondent 
could not comply with the ordinance. However, the 
court found the "notice of violation" was without legal 
justification. 
After finding the September 6, 1972 race was in 
violation of the "Noise Ordinance", the court com-
mitted reversible error in holding that the "notice of 
violation" was without legal justification. The court 
wrongly ignored its own finding of violation of a 
municipal ordinance, when the lease agreement in 
paragraphs 9 and 16, specifically states that such a 
violation is grounds for the issuance of said "notice of 
violation". If this determination is allowed to stand then 
the lease agreement and the procedure it employs for 
the issuance of a "notice of violation" is emasculated. 
The trial judge erred in holding that the notice of 
violation was without legal justification. For a second 
reason Paragraph 9 of the lease agreement stipulates 
that Respondent must conduct races on the leased 
premises within all national state, and local laws. 
Paragraph 16 provides that when the Lessee conducts 
races in violation of any of said laws that the Lessor 
must serve upon Lessee a notice of violation and if the 
Lessee cannot demonstrate its ability to conduct races 
within local ordinances, the lease may be terminated. 
The early cases hold that when subsequent 
legislation makes a prior contract illegal either in its 
object or in its performance then both parties are 
excused from performance and breach of contract is 
not available against either party. Corbin on Contracts 
8 
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si343. The only caveat to this general rule is that the 
Lessee must have an opportunity to correct, as 
provided for in the lease agreement. 
But once the Lessor is made aware that the leased 
premises are being used for an illegal purpose he has a 
duty to inform the Lessee of the violation and require a 
cessation of the illegal use. If the Lessor does not in-
dicate his disapproval of the Lessee's illegal use of the 
premise, he may be held in pari dilicto with the Lessee 
and courts will not lend the Lessor aid in collecting 
rent, Kessler v. Pearson 126 Ga. 725, 55 S.E.963. 
Even absent a provision in the lease, a landlord 
is said to have the right to void a lease when a use of the 
premises by the tenant violates a zoning law. 101CJ.S., 
Zoning, S138. Furthermore, even a minor breach is 
sufficient to justify a termination of a contract if the 
contract is so worded. Ritter v. Perma Stone Co. 325 
P.2d.442 (Okl.1958). The lease between Appellant and 
Respondent provides that any violation of local, state, 
or municipal ordiance or law is a sufficient ground to 
terminate the lease and further that respondent "shall 
comply" which submitted is a broader requirement 
than a violation. 
The court committed reversible error in ruling that 
the notice of violation was without legal justification. 
The procedure whereby the notice was served, is 
outlined in the lease agreement. Respondent company 
had five days in which to correct, challenge, or show 
they could run races within existing local ordinances, 
and said procedure is in harmony with the existing rules 
governing landlord-tenant relationships. 
The Appellant was put in a delicate position by the 
notice of renewal of the lease at this same time (May, 
1973.) Based on the information that the State had, 
Respondent could not have complied with the "Noise 
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Control" ordinance. Therefore, the State wanted to 
make certain whether or not races could be conducted 
legally before renewing the contract. The Appellant 
was forced to either recognize the lease and run the risk 
that by renewing the lease it would waive any right to 
complain of breaches or to serve a notice of violation 
51C. C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant SI 17 (3). 
Given the two considerations: (1) renewal of the 
contract may have jeopardized the Appellants op-
portunity to enlist the aid of the courts in collecting 
rent; (Kessler v. Pearson 126Ga. 725, 55 S.E. 963) and 
(2) the potential that renewal of the lease knowing of a 
violation of a local ordinance may have constituted a 
waiver of the right to complain of breaches 51C-C.J.S. 
Landlord - Tenant SI 17 (3); the Appellant decided to 
serve the notice of violation. As this procedure was 
outlined in the lease agreement and in harmony with 
the law governing landlord and tenant relations, the 
court erred in holding the notice of violation without 
legal justification. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
NOTICE OF VIOLATION SERVED MAY 12, 1973 
WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE TERMS OF THE 
LEASE. 
Under the lease agreement there are two ways the 
lease can be terminated. Paragraph 13 provides for an 
automatic termination: 
"It is expressly understood and agreed that in the event 
Lessee's activities upon the leased premises are deter-
mined by any Court having jurisdiction to be unlawful or 
to constitute a public nuisance, whether in litigation 
commenced by anyone. Then and in such event, this lease 
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agreement shall be terminated forthwith, and the 
obligations of both parties hereunder shall be immediately 
avoided and suspended." 
While paragraphs 9 and 16 provide for termination 
by filing a notice of violation and Lessee's failure to 
cure: 
"Lessee shall conduct activities on the above described 
premises in a lawful manner. Lessee will not suffer or 
permit any illegal business or transaction of which it has 
knowledge to take place upon or near said premises. 
Lessee shall comply with all Federal, State and Local Laws 
in connection with its operations upon said premise." 
Paragraph 16 
"The Lessor may terminate this Lease Agreement at any 
time if the Lessee violates any of the terms and conditions 
herein contained, provided, however, said termination 
may not be effected until and unless Lessor has given 
Lessee written notice of each violation and the same 
remains uncorrected for a period of (5) five days after 
receipt of said notice." 
Both methods of termination of the contract are 
valid, however, the method used by the Respondent 
was the method relying on paragraphs 9 and 16. The 
notice of violation specifically stated it was served 
pursuant to paragraph 9 of the lease. That this method 
is recognized as valid by the Utah Supreme Court is 
shown in the case of Gerard v. Young 20U.2d.30, 432 
P.2d.343 (1967). In Gerard the Lessor was entitled to 
terminate the lease where the leased premises were 
being used in violation of State law and the violation 
continued. 
On the 16th day of August, 1972 an ordinance was 
passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
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City, Utah by adding Chapter 9, entitled "Noise 
Control" to Title 32 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Respondent was aware of this or-
dinance and through its attorney, Mr. Lee Hobbs, 
wrote to the Salt Lake City Commission to acquire an 
exemption from the ordinance on August 14, 1972. The 
request reads as follows: 
"With reference to the 'Noise Abatement' ordinance 
which your Honorable Body is presently considering, my 
client, The Fairgrounds Speedway Company, has 
presently scheduled automobile racing at the State Fair 
Grounds in Salt Lake City for August 19, 26 and Sep-
tember 4. They have also scheduled the Tournament of 
Thrills' for August 21 and 22." 
"My client presently holds a license issued by Salt Lake 
City to carry on these shows, which are scheduled bet-
ween 5:00 o'clock and 10:30 o'clock P.M. on the dates 
noted." 
"We respectfully request that these scheduled activities be 
exempted from the proposed ordinance, upon its passage, 
pursuant to Section 32-8-9 (e) of the ordinance, and we 
hereby request permission to continue with these shows 
on the dates indicated pursuant to 32-8-11 (b) and (c). 
The City Commission granted the exemption to 
terminate September 4, 1972, at 10:00 o'clock P.M. 
They granted the exemption because Respondent had 
scheduled their races prior to the passing of the or-
dinance: 
"The Board of City Commissioners, at its meeting today, 
considered your request referred to as Petition No. 491 of 
1972, that the automobile races which you have scheduled 
at the State Fairgrounds for August 19 and 26-September 
4, 1972, and also the Tournament of Thrills' for August 21 
and 22, 1972 between 5:00 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on said 
12 
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dates, be exempted from the proposed 'Noise Abatement' 
ordinance, upon its passage, pursuant to Section 32-8-9 (e) 
of the ordinance, and for permission to continue with 
these shows on the dates indicated pursuant to Section 32-
8-11 (b) and (c)." 
"Inasmuch as these commitments were made prior to the 
adoption of the noise ordinances, the City Commission 
granted your request, subject to the provision that these 
activities will conclude at 10:30p.m. on the dates 
requested. Thereafter, full compliance with the noise 
ordinance will be necessary. (Emphasis added)" 
On the 6th day of September, 1972, after the 
exemption had expired, the Respondent conducted 
races which violated the "Noise Control" ordinance. 
This race was the last race of the 1972 season, but on 
April 9, 1973, the Respondent requested a special 
permit from the Salt Lake City Commission to conduct 
races during the 1973 season which would violate the 
"Noise Control" ordinance. A hearing was held May 10, 
1973, pursuant to that request, to consider the merits of 
the request. At the hearing the Respondent, through its 
president, Ferrol Papworth, represented that it would 
be impossible for them to conduct legal races unless 
their request was granted. The Board of City Com-
missioners denied the request. 
As the Respondent had conducted races on 
September 6, 1972 which were in violation of the 
"Noise Control" ordinance, and as it was not given an 
exemption by the Salt Lake City Commission for the 
1973, the Attorney General's Office, acting for the 
Division of Exposition of the State of Utah, filed a 
notice of violation with the Respondent on May 12, 
1973. 
This notice of violation was authorized by 
paragraphs 9 and 16 of the Lease Agreement, 
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Respondent had in fact violated a local law (paragraph 
9) which gave the Appellant the right to file a notice of 
violation pursuant to paragraph 16 of the lease 
agreement. Further it was reasonable to believe that 
Respondent could not comply with the ordinance 
provision unless changes were made. 
This notice of violation gave the Respondent five 
days to cure, it was presented on the day of a race and if 
Respondent had been able to race that day within the 
allowed decibel limits of the "Noise Control" or-
dinance, the termination mentioned in paragraph 16 
would not have become effective. 
The actions of the Appellant were in concert with 
the provisions of the lease agreement. The procedure 
required by the lease agreement when the premises 
were used in violation of State law was followed. 
Consequently the trial judge committed reversible 
error in holding that the notice of violation was in 
violation of the lease. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENT BASED ON 
ACTIONS OF THE APPELLANT WHICH WERE IN 
HARMONY WITH THE LEASE AGREEMENT AND 
NON-ACTION ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT 
WHO FAILED TO EITHER CURE OR CHALLENGE 
THE NOTICE OF VIOLATION. 
The lease agreement itself sets up the method by 
which Respondent-Lessee is to be notified by Ap-
pellant-Lessor that Lessor has reason to believe Lessee 
is violating a local ordinance or cannot comply with the 
local ordinance. The Court failed to take intn 
^e fact that the contract entitle, J f ^ ^ ^ 
"once based on a r—J **mcs L e « 0 f fo .«,„,„ . 
that 
- * i-c-i mat tne co tract e title r «^uiifl, 
14 e'-I"s^bmiUed.. 
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Appellant had a reasonable basis for believing 
Respondent had, was or would violate the Salt Lake 
City Ordinance. The Statement of Facts shows that 
tests were run and Respondent knew that racing at the 
Fairgrounds would violate the noise levels imposed by 
the ordinance. Appellant knew of the action of Salt 
Lake City in denying the variance and was in fact in 
close contact with the City Attorney. That denial by the 
city was based on test results of Irvine Accoustical 
Engineers. Appellant knew that the lease was up for 
renewal and knew that Appellant was to race on the 
12th. Based on information and belief the notice of 
violation was served pursuant to paragraph 9. 
It is important to note that after the Appellant 
served its notice based upon what information it had 
the Respondent did absolutely nothing. Respondent did 
not run its race on the 12th as scheduled but cancelled 
it. It did not seek injunctive relief or try to respond to 
or challenge the notice of violation in any way. It 
served no letters on the Appellant saying a mistake had 
been made. Instead it did nothing to mitigate the effect 
of the notice of violation other than file a law suit for 
damages. 
It is submitted that Respondent's had some af-
firmative duty to attempt to cure the notice of violation 
or in some way respond to the notice or challenge the 
notice in some way other than doing nothing about the 
notice. Respondent should not be awarded damages 
when Appellant sends a notice pursuant to a contract 
provision and Respondent does nothing about the 
situation. 
The lease contemplates a possible termination of 
the lease in the event that the Respondent does not 
comply with all provisions of local state and federal 
law. (see paragraphs 9 and 16). A method was also 
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prescribed for the Appellant to proceed with steps to 
eventually terminate the lease if such a non-
compliance, either actual or anticipatory, did occur. 
h (Paragraph 16 of Lease Agreement.) 
In order to effect any termination for non-
compliance, either actual or anticipatory, the Ap-
pellant must comply with the method prescribed by the 
parties in the contract. There can be no termination 
unless the notice of termination complies with all 
requirements relating thereto. Texas and N.O.R. Co., v. 
Phillips, 196 F.2d 692 (1952). Where a contract is 
specifically mentioned in a notice given under it, the 
terms of the contract are controlling. Furthermore a 
notice given under a contract providing for such notice 
must be construed according to the intention of the 
parties to the contract. Therefore, in construing the 
notice of violation, (which is not a notice of ter-
mination) the terms of the contract for which such 
notice is given should be used in interpreting the 
notice. The lease agreement requires five days after a 
notice of violation is served for the Respondent to 
correct any violation. The parties to the lease 
agreement must have intended this five day leeway to 
allow the Respondent time to correct or cure violations 
or challenge the notice in order to prevent a forfeiture 
or a termination of the lease. Therefore, the Appellant 
in its notice of violation served notice that the 
Respondent had five days to correct its deficiency 
consist with the lease agreement. This would require 
some showing that Respondent could comply with the 
Salt Lake City noise ordinance or in some way change 
their requirements. If the Respondent corrected the 
I' violation in that five day period no termination could 
occur. As noted in 51 C-C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant, 
SI 14 (3) , a notice of termination must give Lessee the 
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time specified in the lease, prior to the time when 
forfeiture is declared. The Lessee is entitled to the time 
specified in the notice in which to cure the default, 
prior to the taking effect of the forfeiture. The notice of 
violation should not be construed otherwise since it is 
impossible for any one party to alter the terms of the 
lease agreement without the consent of the other party 
to the contract. In other words, it would have been 
impossible for the State of Utah to shorten the five day 
period as required by the lease agreement, or enforce a 
forfeiture if a cure was made. 
The effect of a period for a tenant to cure a defect 
or a violation is found in the case of Caranas v. Morgan 
Hosts, 460 S.W. 2d 225 (1970). In that case the lease 
required the use of a particular kind of cash register on 
the premises by the Lessee. However, the Lessee failed 
to use such a cash register and the Landlord served a 
written notice to cure the defect within thirty days 
according to the lease, or he subject to termination 
without notice. The Court held that where the Ap-
pellant had failed to cure the defect that the breach was 
sufficient to justify a termination of the lease. Thus, 
where terms allow for a correction of a defect the 
tenant has the duty to cure the defect or to suffer a 
termination thereafter. 
In the case of Collins v. Isaacson, 261 Iowa 236, 
158 N.W.2d 14 (1968), the tenant did correct the 
violation within the time allowed and was therefore not 
required to suffer a termination of his lease. With 
respect to the thirty day period for correction the court 
said the following: 
Further, the lease prepared by Plaintiff, provides, as 
quoted supra, that a forfeiture could be declared if 
defendant failed to make the payment contemplated 
therein or to perform any of its covenants, by serving a 
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thirty day notice of forfeiture, provided defendant 'shall 
fail to pay said sum or sums, or perform said conditions in 
default within said thirty day period. . . .' It stands 
admitted that within the thirty day period defendant made 
a good and sufficient tender to Plaintiff of all sums due 
him under the lease-option agreement in the event the 
option were exercised. Plaintiff's right to declare a for-
feiture of the agreement did not mature. 
Additional support for the conclusion, that a 
tenant has an affirmative duty to correct defects during 
a period allowed therefore, is found in 17 Am.Jur. 2d 
Contracts S356. 
In some cases, a notice of default is required and the 
purpose of such a notice in the usual case, is to give the 
party allegedly in default an opportunity to remedy the 
default and meet his obligations. 
From the preceeding authority it is clear that a 
tenant is allowed the period noted in a lease agreement 
to correct any violation noted by the landlord. If he 
corrects the violation within that time the landlord's 
right to a forfeiture does not mature and no forfeiture 
can take place. However, if he fails to correct the 
violation in that time then the right to declare a for-
feiture does mature and unless the landlord otherwise 
waives the right to a forfeiture the lease will terminate. 
The Appellant served a notice of violation upon 
the Respondent on May 12, allowing the five day period 
for correction of the violation. Had the Respondent 
corrected the violation or made any attempt to indicate 
the violation did not exist or would be corrected, a right 
to declare a termination would not have matured in 
favor of the Appellant. It was the duty of the 
Respondent to correct the violation or else suffer the 
results of a termination. However, there is no evidence 
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that the Respondent attempted any such correction in 
order to continue its lease. In fact the testimony is that 
Respondent chose not to run the race or cure the 
allegations set forth in the notice of violation. In the 
Caranas case, supra, when the Lessee failed to correct 
the violation the lease was held to be terminated by the 
court. The Respondent should not be allowed now to 
come forward and request damages after it has already 
failed in its duty to correct the violations noted in the 
notice of violation. Had the Respondent made an at-
tempt to correct the violations as in the Collins case, 
supra, and succeeded in correcting the violation as it 
did in that case, there would have been no reason for a 
termination and they would have continued racing for 
the 1973 season without any problem. 
It should be noted that the notice served on May 
12 was only a notice of violation, and not a notice of 
termination. All the notice of violation attempted to do 
was to require the plaintiff to correct that violation if 
possible. Since that notice of violation served on the 
Respondent the Appellant has constantly reminded the 
Salt Bowl Company that they could conduct races on 
the State Fairgrounds if they would comply with the 
Salt Lake City Noise Ordinance. This, in effect, has 
extended the five day period to allow them to show a 
correction of any violation. However, the Respondent 
has failed to meet this duty to show a correction in 
order to justify any extension of the lease. Therefore, 
the Respondent should not be allowed to come forward 
requesting damages after numerous opportunities to 
show their lease should be continued. 
The court erred in finding a wrongful termination 
of the lease based on the notice of violation being in 
violation of the terms of the lease. The notice by the 
terms of the lease calls for termination if the violation is 
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not challenged. The duty to stop the termination is on 
the Respondent which duty Appellant submits 
Respondent did not discharge in any way or even at-
tempt to discharge in any way. 
SUMMARY and CONCLUSION 
It was error for the Court to find that Appellant 
wrongfully terminated the lease. In order to so find the 
Court committed error by finding the notice of 
violation was not legally justified when the terms of the 
lease (Paragraphs 9, 16) specifically outline the 
procedure by which a notice of violation is to be served 
and on what basis. The notice of violation itself 
specifically states it was served pursuant to paragraph 9 
of the Lease. The Court found that the race on the 6th 
(which is the day mentioned in the notice of violation) 
was in violation of the ordinance which simply means 
that the Court found sufficient evidence to conclude 
that races run on a regular basis without some 
modification for noise were run at noise levels in excess 
of the ordinance requirements. This means that the 
races were run in excess of the noise levels and it is 
reasonable to believe that any other races would also 
be in excess of the noise levels required by the or-
dinance. The testimony from the Attorney General's 
office was that it was concern for the noise levels and 
the fact that no variance was granted by the City which 
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prompted its service of the notice of violation. The 
notice of violation doesn't terminate the lease unless 
the Respondent fails to do some affirmative act to cure, 
challenge or comply. The testimony is that Respondent 
did nothing and in fact cancelled its race on the 12th 
which could have shown compliance if the noise levels 
had been below those required by the ordinance. It was 
the act of the Respondent in doing nothing that caused 
the termination not the notice of violation served by 
Appellant. 
It was error for the court to award damages as the 
contract was not wrongfully terminated but required 
the non-action of the Respondent to effect the ter-
mination. The Respondent did not attempt in any way 
to mitigate its damages, challenge the notice or resist 
the effect of the notice of violation. 
It is submitted that it was clearly error for the 
Court to find for Respondent in this matter when there 
was a basis for a notice of violation and the Contract 
procedures were followed. The Respondent clearly did 
nothing to resist the effect of the notice of violation and 
as the Court concluded was running races at noise 
levels above those set forth in the ordinance. The race 
on the 6th was in fact a violation and without a variance 
any other race would be a violation. The Respondent 
failed to obtain a variance and the notice was served. If 
the notice had not been served the Appellant is then in 
the position of reasonably knowing of illegal and 
unlawful practices on the premises and doing nothing 
about it. As a public body the Appellant felt it had a 
duty to serve the notice of violation as Respondent 
could always race if it were in compliance. However, 
Respondent never took the opportunity to show it 
could and its past history would reasonably lead one to 
believe it could not comply. is 
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To rule for Respondent as the court did is 
reversible error and Appellant prays for a reversal of 
that ruling as a matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON R. STRONG 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
197 South Main Street 
Springville, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
Respondents 
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